Cyber Extortion and Threats: Analysis of the United States Case Law by Vasiu, Ioana & Vasiu, Lucian
2020] I. Vasiu, L. Vasiu: Cyber Extortion and Threats ... 3
CYBER EXTORTION AND THREATS:
ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES CASE LAW
by
IOANA VASIU*, LUCIAN VASIU**
This article presents an analysis of the cyber extortion and threats cases brought
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important  litigation  aspects,  such  as intent,  true  threats,  sentencing,  and
the insanity defense. The article concludes with recommendations for stakeholders,
to more effectively address the phenomenon.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Cyberviolence” involves the use of information systems to
“cause,  facilitate,  or threaten violence against  individuals that  results  in,
or is  likely  to result  in,  physical,  sexual,  psychological  or economic  harm
or suffering  and  may  include  the exploitation  of the individual’s
circumstances, characteristics or vulnerabilities.”1
“Cyberviolence”  comprises  numerous  offenses,  among  these  cyber
extortion and threats represent important categories.
Cyber extortion and threats are acts of
“conditional speech intended to influence or gain compliance from a target
recipient.”2
These communications can be effective in gaining the “feeling of power and
control”3 over  victims.4 These  offenses  cover  a range  of  forms,  including
intimate partner violence (IPV), violence against women and girls (VAWG),
cyber dating abuse (CDA) and so on.
It  is  difficult  to quantify  the full  extent  of the phenomenon;  however,
as it  produces  significant  negative  personal,  economic,  and  societal
consequences,  is  regarded  as one  that  needs  to be  more  effectively
addressed.5 This  article  aims  to present  an analysis  of the phenomenon’s
1 Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY). (2018) Mapping Study on Cyberviolence. [online]
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, 5, Available from: https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-2017-10-cbg-study-
provisional/16808c4914 [Accessed 1 July 2019].
2 Spitzberg,  B.H.  and  Gawron,  J.M.  (2016)  Toward  Online  Linguistic  Surveillance
of Threatening Messages. Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 11, p. 47.
3 United States v. Killen. (2018) No. 15-15001 (11th Cir.), 29 March.
4 Fontana v.  United  States.  (2020)  No.  14-20141 (E.D.  Mich.),  17 April;  Bumb, M. L.  (2017)
Domestic  Violence  Law,  Abusers’  Intent,  and  Social  Media:  How  Transaction-Bound
Statutes  Are  the True  Threats  to Prosecuting  Perpetrators  of Gender-Based  Violence.
Brooklyn Law Review, 82 (2), pp. 917–960.
5 See,  e.g. Van Der Wilk,  A.  (2018)  Cyber  violence  and  hate  speech online  against  women.  PE
604.979. Brussels:  European Parliament. Available from: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604979/IPOL_STU(2018)604979_EN.pdf [Accessed 1 July 2019];
U.S. Department of Justice. (2016)  The National Strategy for Child Exploitation Prevention and
Interdiction.  [online]  Washington:  U.S.  Department  of Justice.  Available  from:
https://www.justice.gov/psc/file/842411/download [Accessed 20 October 2019]; Women and
Gender  Equality  Canada.  (2019)  New federal  investment  will  help  end  cyberviolence. [press
release] 27 August. Available from: https://www.canada.ca/en/status-women/news/2019/08/
new-federal-investment-will-help-end-cyberviolence.html  [Accessed  3  December  2019];
European  Institute  for  Gender  Equality.  (2017)  Cyber  violence  against  women  and  girls.
Available from: https://eige.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/cyber_violence_against
_women_and_girls.pdf  [Accessed  3  December  2019];  Peterson,  J.  and  Densley,  J.  (2017)
Cyber Violence: What Do We Know and Where Do We Go From Here?.  Aggression and
Violent Behavior, 34, pp. 195–196; Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY). (2018) Mapping
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attributes and of the most important litigation aspects. The analysis is based
on a large  corpus  of data,  consisting  of several  hundred  cases  brought
to the U.S. courts.  This inquiry employed content analysis to identify and
group  important  elements  and  issues.  The article  answers  the following
research questions:  What are the attributes  of the phenomenon? What are
the elements of cyber extortion and threats that the legal system addresses?
How do the courts interprets these crimes?
The article  proceeds  in three  Sections.  The  next  Section  discusses
the attributes  of the cyber  extortion  and  threats  phenomenon.  Section  3
outlines  the legal  framework  for  these  offenses.  Section  4,  based
on the comprehensive study of cases brought to federal courts in violation
of the federal threat statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875 (c) & (d),  presents an analysis
of important  litigation  aspects:  intent,  “true  threats”,  sentencing  aspects,
and the insanity defense. The article  concludes with recommendations for
stakeholders, to more effectively address the phenomenon.
2. ATTRIBUTES OF THE PHENOMENON
2.1. THREATS
A “threat” is
“an avowed  present  determination  or intent  to injure  presently
or in the future.”6
There  are  two  main  forms  of threats:  interpersonal  and  impersonal.
Interpersonal threats, which can be encountered in cases of direct relations,
in a variety  of contexts,  are  transmitted  with  a view  to obtain  recipient’s
compliance.  Impersonal  threats  target  groups  of people  (for  instance,
members of law enforcement agencies, civil liberties organizations, minority
groups,  etc.)7 or leaders,  and  can  be  encountered  in cases  of perceived
Study on Cyberviolence.  T-CY(2017)10.  Strasbourg:  Council  of  Europe,  4,  Available  from:
https://rm.coe.int/t-cy-2017-10-cbg-study-provisional/16808c4914  [Accessed  1  July  2019];
European  Union  Agency  for  Law  Enforcement  Cooperation  (Europol).  (2017)  Internet
Organised Crime Threat Assessment. The Hague: Europol. Available from: https://www.euro
pol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/iocta2017.pdf [Accessed 1 June 2018]. 
6 United States v. Alkhabaz. (1997) 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir.), 29 January.
7 See,  e.g. United  States  v. Jordan.  (2017) No.  16-CR-93-FPG-HKS-1  (W.D.N.Y.),  24  October
(the defendant posted on Facebook the message “Lets Start Killin Police Lets See How Dey Like
It.”);  United  States  v. Carrillo.  (2020) No.  1:  19-cr-01991  KWR  (D.N.M.),  8  April
(the defendant,  via  Facebook,  communicated  a threat  to injure  ACLU  personnel);  United
States v. Doggart. (2020) 947 F.3d 879 (6th Cir.), 15 January (the defendant planned to destroy
a religious community in New York state). 
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distress  or coercion,  created  by certain  pressures  (e.g. political,  economic,
or social).
Threats can be also be categorized as reactive, when responding to real
or perceived  events  or threats  (for  example,  as retaliation8 or reaction  for
the loss of social status), and proactive, when attempting to achieve certain
goals (to “align” the threateners’ desires or wishes and the actual reality).9
A subcategory  of the latter  is  the infliction  of fear  for  threateners’  own
gratification or enjoyment.10
Threats  usually  aim  to determine  the recipient  to comply with  certain
requests,  rather  than actually  engaging with  them in the course of action
described. Nevertheless, these threats have a complex relationship to actual
harm. Such communications can inflict
“psychological  harm  on the listener  in the direct  manner  that  a physical
attack would inflict physical harm.”11
Further, the harm
“may be real whether or not the individual speaker intended his speech to be
received as a threat, and regardless of whether the speaker actually intended
to carry out such a threat.”12
Cyber extortion and threats are not new offenses. However, cyberspace
and  social  media  platforms,  in particular,  make  much  more  difficult
to determine  threateners’  actual  state  of mind  and  what  are  the actual
capabilities  of the threateners  with  respect  to carry  out  the threats.
Additionally,  technology permits  the transmission  of threats  using  a false
identity  or the identity  of another  person,13 and  to reach  a large  number
8 United  States  v. Telfair.  (2020) No.  19-CR-270  (E.D.N.Y.),  3  February  (the defendant
threatened a witness who testified against the defendant’s brother in a criminal case).
9 See Criminal Complaint,  United States v. Swarbrick.  (2018)  Case 3:18-MJ-1214 (M.D. Tenn.),
19 September. Available from: https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2018
/09/EricSwarbrick.pdf (in an attempt to meet with a famous singer, the defendant sent tens
of threatening letters and e-mails) [Accessed 1 June 2019].
10 See, e.g. United States v. Haileselassie.  (2019) No. 18-1343 (8th Cir.), 10 June (the defendant
made bomb threats at a community college).
11 Han, D.S. (2014) The Mechanics of First Amendment Audience Analysis.  William and Mary
Law Review, 55, pp. 1647, 1659.
12 Romney, J. (2012) Eliminating the Subjective Intent Requirement for True Threats in United
States v. Bagdasarian. Brigham Young University Law Review, 2012, pp. 639, 653.
13 See United States v. Turrella. (2012) No. 10-30051 (9th Cir.), 15 March.
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of people,  potentially  amplifying  the fear  or the anxiety.14 Even  more
disturbing,  threats  can  be  of the anti-social  type,  transmitted
anonymously,15 and could reach people (online viewers or followers), who,
in turn,  may  potentially  be  encouraged  or willing  to fulfill  the call  for
violent actions, thus producing a spread or proliferation effect.
The communication  of threats  can  be  brought  about  by numerous
motivational  states,  rational  or irrational.  The threatening  content  can
regard personal  honor  or dignity,  incitement  to discrimination,  or violent
actions  against  certain  people  or groups  of people.  To achieve  their
objective,  threateners  use  a range  of threats:  to injure  the property,
reputation, or the person of another, to kidnap or kill the victims.
The language  employed  in the communications  can  be  clear,  but  also
implied,  veiled,  or cryptical.16 In a number  of cases,  the language  used  is
truly malignant, sadistic and extreme. To illustrate the point through a few
examples, the defendant in United States v. Wheeler threatened to
“kill cops[,] drown them in the blood of thier [sic] children, hunt them down
and kill their entire bloodlines;”17
in United States v. Cain, the defendant, in brutal terms, threatened to kill his
ex-wife, her mother and her new boyfriend, to send to members of ex-wife’s
family videotapes showing the victim engaged in sexual acts,  and to rape
victim’s  daughter;18 in United  States  v. Heineman,  the defendant,  a white
supremacy sympathizer, sent to the victim e-mails containing reprehensible
statements, such as
“slay you, by a bowie knife shoved up into the skull from your pig chin you
choke, with blood flooding in your filthily treasonous throat!;”19
in United States v. Williams, the defendant threatened to kill a judge,
14 See  Criminal  Complaint  at 2  et seq.,  United  States  v. Bishop.  (2018)  Case  118MJ24LDA
(D.R.I.), 23 January (defendant sent hundreds of threatening e-mails to his former girlfriend,
her family, and three state prosecutors, victims expressing “extreme fear for their safety”).
15 See,  e.g. United  States  v. Bagdasarian.  (2011) 652  F.3d  1113  (9th  Cir.),  19  July (on a Yahoo
message board, the defendant posted threats anonymously).
16 See,  e.g. Memorandum Opinion  and Order  at 18,  United  States  v. White.  (2010) Criminal
Action No. 7:08-CR-00054 (W.D. Va.), 20 January.
17 See, e.g. United States v. Wheeler. (2019) Criminal Case No. 12-cr-0138-WJM (D. Colo.), 9 July.
18 United States v. Cain. (2018) No. 1: 16-cr-00103-JAW (D. Me.), 1 June.
19 United States v. Heineman. (2014) 767 F.3d 970, 972 (10th Cir.), 15 September.
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“sodomize the corpse, chop it into pieces, and mail one piece of the corpse
to the courthouse each week.”20
The inclusion of unsettling images, as means to make the “message” more
powerful,  can  also  be  noted:  in United  States  v. Vandevere,  for  instance,
the defendant sent a “tweet” that contained a lynching picture.21
There  are  numerous  threat  communication  means,  mainly  e-mail;22
telephone;23 online  call  spoofing  services;24 and  social  media  platforms.
In United  States  v. Michael,  to illustrate  the latter,  the defendant  posted
on Facebook threats to “kidnap and injure DEA agents and personnel” and that
it’s
“time we answered their crimes with bloodshed and torture.”25
In Commonwealth v. Knox, for another example, the appellant recorded and
uploaded to YouTube  a rap song titled  “F--k the Police”.26 The song’s lyrics
expressed hatred and contained
“descriptions of killing police informants and police officers.”27
The court held that the
“threats to the officers were real, specific and violent, with nothing of record
to indicate that the threats should not be taken seriously”
20 United States v. Williams. (2018) No. 17-2454 (8th Cir.), 26 October.
21 United States v. Vandevere. (2019) No. 1: 19-cr-63-MOC (W.D.N.C.), 16 September.
22 See, e.g. United States v. White. (2017) Criminal Action No. 7: 13CR00013 (W.D. Va.), 31 May
(the defendant sent several e-mails, threatening to injure his ex-wife, if she did not send him
“alimony” payments);  United States v. Gillenwater.  (2014) 749 F.3d 1094 (9th Cir.), 11 April
(defendant sent an e-mail threatening the life of another); United States v. McCrudden. (2015)
No. CR-11-061 (DRH) (E.D.N.Y.), 16 March (defendant sent an e-mail claiming that he hired
people to kill the victim).
23 See,  e.g. Criminal  Complaint,  United  States  v. Lisnyak.  (2015) Case  No.  15-04179MJ-PCT-
DMF (D. Ariz.), 16 July; United States v. Champ, United States v. Wood. (2006) 459 F. Supp. 2d
451 (E.D. Va.), 29 September.
24 See,  e.g. Criminal  Complaint,  United  States  v. Kadar.  (2017) Case No.  6:17-mj-1361  (M.D.
Fla.), 4 April at 4.
25 United States v. Michael. (2012) No. 2: 12-cr-1-WTL-CMM (S.D. Ind.), 9 October.
26 Commonwealth v. Knox. (2018) 190 A.3d 1146, 1149 (Pa.), 21 August.
27 Op. cit., at 1149.
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or that the defendants would not be able to “carry them out.”28 The fervency
of threats  can  be  increased  through  repeat  communications  and  the use
of multiple means.29
2.2. EXTORTIONATE THREATS
“Extortion”  encompasses  numerous  forms  and  has  multiple  definitions.
The Florida  law  definition,  for  instance,  includes,  among  other  things,
the use  of threats  to injure  a person’s  reputation,  to expose  another
to disgrace,  or to reveal  “any  secret  affecting  another” for  the purpose
of compelling the victim
“to do any act or refrain from doing any act against his or her will.”30 
According to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.), “extortion” refers to
“obtaining  something  of value  from  another  by the wrongful  use
of (A) force, (B) fear of physical injury, or (C) threat of physical injury.” 
“Something  of  value”  includes  money,  property,  an advantage,  or even
a sexual relationship.31
Extortionate threats cover the making or implying of threats that intend
to induce the belief  that victim’s power, wealth, social  standing,  personal
or job security, or self-esteem are or could be endangered. The extortionist
must  use  threats  with  a view  to “obtain”  or “acquire”  property,  not  just
to deprive or dispossess the victim of it.32 An important element of extortion
is
“that  of obtaining  property  from  another  ‘with  his  consent’  induced
by wrongful use of threats.”33
Professor Steven Shavell,  the Director of the John M. Olin Center for Law,
Economics, and Business at the Harvard Law School, explains that threateners
28 Op. cit., at 1174.
29 See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Leach. (2017) Case No. 2:17mj-44-1 (D. Vt.), 21 April
(the defendant transmitted repeated death threats, via Facebook, e-mail, and telephone).
30 2019 Florida Statutes 836.05 Threats; extortion. In English. Available from: http://www.leg.
state.fl.us/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=0800-0899/0836/Sections/0
836.05.html [Accessed 1 July 2019]. 
31 United States v. Petrovic. (2012) 701 F.3d 849 (8th Cir.), 13 December.
32 Scheidler v. National Organization for Women. (2003) 537 U.S. 393, 26 February.
33 Green, S.P. (2005) Theft by Coercion: Extortion, Blackmail, and Hard Bargaining. Washburn
Law Journal, 44, p. 553 (the consent is “coerced when it is obtained by threat or force”).
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must make credible threats, so that the victims would believe that there is
“significant chance that the threat will be carried out if and only if he does
not accede to it,”
and, if the threateners are rewarded, the victim
“will gain thereby and not merely set himself up for further threats.”34
Nevertheless,  as seen  in a number  of cases,  the victims  that  gave
in to extortionate  threats  are  likely  to be  suffer  continued,  repeated
demands  from  the perpetrators,  a situation  that  can  become a prolonged
or extended dominance-subordination relationship.
Threats to commit an unlawful act amount to “extortion” if the threat “is
to  be  carried  out  in  the  future.”35 To extort  their  victims,  perpetrators  may
threaten  to,  for  instance,  damage the victim’s  property  or reputation  (for
example, by releasing damaging photos and videos36 or libelous material),
or even  falsely  accuse  the  victim.37 Some  of the main  forms  of extortion
include the influence of justice,  sextortion,38 sexual coercion and extortion
(SCE),  reputation  damage,39 etc.  In White  v. United  States,  for  illustration,
the defendant,  with the intent  to extort  the dismissing  of the state  charges
against members of a white supremacist group, threatened to “kidnap, rape,
and  murder” a judge,  the State  Attorney,  and  a federal  agent,  to behead
them, and to paint on walls with their blood.40
In a number  of cases,  as the result  of the extortion  of victims,
perpetrators  aimed  to obtain  self-generated  explicit  materials  (SGEM)
or self-generated indecent material (SGIM).41 In United States v. Fontana, for
example,  the defendant,  posing  as a minor  boy  on a chat  website,  asked
34 Shavell,  S.  (1993)  An Economic  Analysis  of Threats  and  Their  Illegality:  Blackmail,
Extortion, and Robbery. University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 141, p. 1878.
35 Berman,  M.N.  (1998)  The Evidentiary  Theory  of Blackmail:  Taking  Motives  Seriously.
University of Chicago Law Review, 65, pp. 795, 853.
36 See United States v. Gomez. (2020) No. 18-12089 (11th Cir.), 14 February.
37 United States v. Avenatti. (2020) No.(S1) 19 Cr. 373 (PGG) (S.D.N.Y.), 14 January.
38 This form of extortion is characterized by threats that aim to humiliate the victim by posting
online compromising sexual images or recordings. For instance, the distribution of videos,
unless  the suspects  receive  monetary  compensation, see,  e.g. In the Matter  of Search
of a Residence in Oakland. (2019) Case No. 4-19-70053 (N.D. Cal.), 10 January.
39 See  United  States  v. Coss.  (2012)  677  F.3d  278  (6th  Cir.),  16  April:  threatening  to injure
someone’s  reputation,  the threat  must  be  “wrongful”  but  it  need not  be  independently
illegal.
40 White v. United States. (2019) No. 6: 17-cv-689-Orl-28GJK (M.D. Fla.), 14 February.
41 United States v. Killen. (2018) No. 15-15001 (11th Cir.), 29 March.
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a minor  female  to take  off  her  shirt.42 Without  the victim’s  knowledge,
the defendant  recorded  the act  and  subsequently  threatened  to publish
online of the recording, in order to “take over” the victim’s life and force her
to
“perform more,  increasingly invasive sexual  acts,  which he  recorded and
used as additional leverage.”43
In United  States  v.  Abrahams44,  the defendant,  to hide  his  identity  and
to obtain nude photos and videos, used malware and other computer tools,
to operate  remotely  the victims’  web  cams,  without  their  consent.
The perpetrator  made  extortionate  threats  of publicly  posting
the compromising  photos  or videos  to the victims’  social  media  accounts,
unless the latter sent more nude photos or videos.45
3. LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Depending  on the circumstances  surrounding  each  case,  several  federal
threat  statutes  can  be  applicable,  such  as 18  U.S.C.  § 115  (influencing,
impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring
a family member);46 18 U.S.C. § 248 (freedom of access to clinic entrances);47
18  U.S.C.  § 871  (threats  against  the President  and  successors
to the Presidency);48 18  U.S.C.  § 1512  (tampering  with  a witness,  victim,
or an informant);49 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (use of weapons of mass destruction).50
42 United States v. Fontana. (2017) No. 16-2208 (6th Cir.), 15 August.
43 Ibid.
44 Complaint.  United States v. Abrahams.  (2013) No. 8:13-mj-00422 (C.D. Cal.),  17 September.
See  also  United  States  v. Chansler.  (2010)  No.  3:10-cr-00100  (M.  D.  Fla.),  15  April.
(the defendant  enticed the victim to send him sexually  explicit  images  and videos,  then
threatened  to injure  the victim’s  reputation  through  the release  of the materials  online
or to the victims’ friends or family, unless he received more such materials). 
45 Ibid.
46 See  United States v. Cruz.  (2017) No. 15-3139 (3d Cir.), 8 November (threatening to assault
and kill a United States Department of Homeland Security agent).
47 See United States v. Dillard. (2011) 835 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Kan.), 21 December.
48 See  United  States  v. Dutcher.  (2017)  851  F.3d  757  (7th  Cir.),  22  March  (the defendant
announced on Facebook  his  plan  to assassinate  President  Obama);  United  States  v. Christy.
(2019) No. 3: 18-CR-223 (M.D. Pa.), 14 February (the defendant posted on Facebook  that he
was “going to shoot President Donald J. Trump in the head”).
49 See, e.g. United States v. Springer.  (2018) No. 17-15584, Non-Argument Calendar (11th Cir.),
26  October  [the defendant,  sympathizer  of a terrorist  organization,  threatened  to assault
and murder a judge,  in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B);  attempted to obstruct justice,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1503 and 2; and attempted to tamper with witnesses, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512(b)].
50 United States v. Parr. (2008) 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir.), 18 September (the defendant threatened
to use a weapon of mass destruction against a federal government building).
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Most  cases  of electronic  threats  are  brought  to courts  in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c):
“Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication
containing  any  threat  to kidnap  any  person  or any  threat  to injure
the person of another, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both.”
Extortionate threats,  on the other hand, following the manner in which
they are committed, can be prosecuted in violation of a number of sections,
such  as 18  U.S.C.  § 875(b)  (interstate  communications  with  intent
to extort);51 18  U.S.C.  § 1030(a)(7)  (transmitting,  with  intent  to extort,
communication  containing  threat  to cause  damage);52 18  U.S.C.  § 1951
(interfering  with  commerce  by robbery,  extortion,  threats  or violence);
18 U.S.C.  § 844(e)  (making  interstate  threats  related to explosives).53 Most
often,  however,  cyber  extortion  cases  are  brought  to courts  in violation
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(d):
“Whoever,  with  intent  to extort  from  any  person,  firm,  association,
or corporation,  any money or other  thing of value,  transmits  in interstate
or foreign  commerce  any  communication  containing  any  threat  to injure
the property  or reputation  of the addressee  or of another  or the reputation
of a deceased  person  or any  threat  to accuse  the addressee  or any  other
person of a crime, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both.”
4. LITIGATION ASPECTS
Cyber-extortion  and  threats  can  be  encountered  in many  forms  and
contexts,  thus  allowing  interpretations  at numerous  levels,  as well
as interesting  arguments  and  viewpoints  to emerge.  The following
subsections illustrate aspects concerning intent, “true threats”, sentencing,
and the insanity defense.
51 See  United  States  v. Smith.  (2017)  878  F.3d  498  (5th  Cir.),  28  December;  United  States
v. Williams. (2012) 693 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.), 7 September.
52 See, e.g. United States v. Fowler. (2010) Case No. 8:10-cr-65-T-24 AEP (M.D. Fla.), 25 October
(upon being fired, the defendant accessed victim’s computers and changed employees’ and
the firewall  passwords);  United  States  v. Ivanov.  (2001) 175  F.  Supp.  2d  367  (D.  Conn.),
6 December (the defendant gained unauthorized control over victim’s computer network,
then threatened the victim with the destruction of its computer systems).
53 See Criminal Complaint, United States v. Kadar. (2017) 6:17-mj-1361 (Fla.), 4 April.
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4.1. INTENT
Criminal  liability  arises  only  when  if a person,  during  the perpetration
of the offense, had a guilty state of mind.54 The U.S. Model Penal Code  lists
four levels of intent: purpose,55 knowledge,56 recklessness,57 and negligence58
(from greatest to least culpability).
“Intent”  has  numerous  meanings,59 the judicial  outcome  depending
upon the meaning embraced by the court.60 As underlined in United States
v. Heineman61, background norms for construing criminal statutes, which 
“presume that intent [i.e. something more than negligence] is the required
mens rea in criminal laws.”
Clearly, without the unambiguous determination of a defendant’s criminal
intent, there can be unintended consequences.
The determination  of “intent”  offers  interesting  arguments  and
examinations. In United States v. Wheeler, for example, the court held that
“it is not necessary to show that a defendant intended to or had the ability
to actually carry out the threat.”62
However,  in United States  v. Gossett63,  the defendant argued that  evidence
that he intended or had the ability to carry out the threats is relevant, as it
“may bear on the requisite mens rea,” and the court agreed.
54 See  Collins,  E.  (2018)  Insane:  James  Holmes,  Clark  v. Arizona,  and  America’s  Insanity
Defense. Journal of Law and Health, 31, p. 33; Kachulis, L. (2017) Insane in the Mens Rea: Why
Insanity Defense Reform is Long Overdue.  Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal,
26, pp. 357, 362.
55 U.S.  Model  Penal  Code,  General  Requirements  of Culpability,  § 2.02(2)(a)(i).  Philadelphia:
American Law Institute. In English.
56 U.S.  Model  Penal  Code,  General Requirements of Culpability,  § 2.02(2)(b)(ii).  Philadelphia:
American Law Institute. In English. 
57 U.S.  Model  Penal  Code,  General  Requirements  of Culpability,  § 2.02(2)(c).  Philadelphia:
American Law Institute. In English. 
58 U.S.  Model  Penal  Code,  General  Requirements  of Culpability,  § 2.02(2)(d).  Philadelphia:
American Law Institute. In English. 
59 See, e.g. Crump, D. (2010) What Does Intent Mean? Hofstra Law Review, 38, p. 1059 (arguing
that  the appropriate  definition  of “intent”  “should  depend  upon  factors  such  as the likely
availability  of proof,  the seriousness  of the offense  or tort,  its  severity  within  a hierarchy  of other
offenses, and the difficulty of otherwise distinguishing innocent conduct”).
60 Op. cit., p. 1061.
61 United Stated v. Heineman.  (2014) 767 F.3d 970, 986-7 (10th Cir.), 14 September (citing Judge
Sutton’s dubitante opinion).
62 United States v. Wheeler. (2015) 776 F.3d 736, 743 (10th Cir.), 15 January.
63 United States v. Gossett. (2019) No. 1: 19-cr-00081 WJ (D.N.M.), 7 May.
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An important  decision  can  be  found in Elonis  v. United  States64,  a case
that  received  very  significant  attention  from  the legal  commentators.65
Elonis  raised  important  questions  regarding  convictions  under  18  U.S.C.
§ 875(c): whether proof of the defendant’s subjective intent to threaten and
proof  of a defendant’s  subjective  intent  to threaten  are  required.
The Supreme Court held that, even though there is no required mental state
specified  in the statute,  it  “does  not  mean  that  none  exists”.66 Further,
the Supreme Court  underlined that convictions under Section 875(c) cannot
be based solely  on a reasonable  person’s  interpretation  of the defendant’s
communication, however, it did not specify what mens rea is required under
this section, reasoning only that the simple negligence standard should be
construed  unconstitutional.67 Since  “intent”  may  not  be  proven  directly,
in order  to make  a determination,  the courts  often  examine
the circumstances and the context associated with the defendants’ actions.
Unlike  Section  875(c),  Section  875(d)  does  contain  a required  mental
state:  the intent  to extort,  consequently  Elonis does  not  apply
to prosecutions under Section 875(d). Extortion generally refers to the intent
to obtain  money  or other  thing  of value  with  a person’s  consent  induced
by the wrongful use of actual or threatened fear, violence, or force.68
In order to prove the intent to extort, prosecutors must demonstrate that
the defendant,  through wrongful  conduct,  did  have the intent  to procure
something  of value,69 without  the need to demonstrate  that  the defendant
actually  intended  to carry  out  the threats  communicated.  As the court
in United Stated v. Killen held,
64 Elonis v. United States. (2015) 135 S. Ct. 2001, 575 U.S., 192 L. Ed. 2D 1, 1 June.
65 See,  e.g. Quek,  J.X.  (2016)  Elonis  v. United  States:  The Next  Twelve  Years.  Berkeley
Technology Law Journal, 31, p. 1109; Brusco, M.A. (2016) Read This Note or Else!: Conviction
Under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) for Recklessly Making a Threat.  Fordham Law Review, 84, p. 2845;
Barney, D. (2016) Elonis v. United States: Why the Supreme Court Punted on Free Speech.
Pepperdine Law Review, 2016, p. 1; Roark, M.M. (2015) Elonis v. United States: The Doctrine
of True Threats: Protecting Our Ever-Shrinking First  Amendment Rights in the New Era
of Communication. Pittsburgh Journal of Technology Law & Policy, 15, p. 197; Pierce, M. (2015)
Prosecuting Online  Threats  After  Elonis.  Northwestern  University  Law Review,  110,  p. 51;
Geha, G. (2016) Think Twice Before Posting Online: Criminalizing Threats Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) After Elonis. John Marshall Law Review, 50, p. 167.
66 Elonis v. United States. (2015) 135 S. Ct. 2001, 575 U.S., 192 L. Ed. 2d 1 at 2009, 1 June.
67 Op. cit., at 2012–13.
68 U.S. Department of Justice. (2010) Prosecuting Computer Crimes. [online] Washington: Office
of Legal  Education  Executive  Office  for  United  States  Attorneys,  p. 53.  Available  from:
https://justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/docs/ccmanual.pdf [Accessed 30 October 2012]. 
69 See United Stated v. Killen. (2018) No. 15-15001, 11th Cir., 29 March.
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“[e]xtortion  only  works  if the [victim]  fears  that  not  paying  will  invite
an unsavory result,”
“to intend to extort one must necessarily intend to instill fear of harm.”70
The court further argued that
“it would be passing strange, indeed impossible, for a defendant to intend
to obtain something by communicating [...] a threat [to injure the property
or reputation  of another  or a threat  to accuse  another  of a crime]  without
also  intending,  understanding,  or,  possibly,  recklessly  disregarding  that
the communication would be perceived as threatening.”71
4.2. TRUE THREATS
The First Amendment stipulates that
“Congress shall make no law [...] abridging the freedom of speech.”72
There  are,  however,  categories  of speech  which  do  not  fall  under  this
protection, such as
“advocacy intended and likely to incite imminent lawless action, obscenity,
defamation, child pornography, fighting words, fraud, true threats, speech
integral to criminal conduct, and speech presenting a grave and imminent
threat the government has the power to prevent.”73
These  aspects  were  analyzed  extensively  by numerous  legal
commentators.74 The prosecution, nonetheless,
“is  not  permitted  to punish  speech  merely  because  the speech  is  forceful
or aggressive.”75
For instance, if a person suggests “revenge”, this does not necessarily imply
breach of any law.76 To further complicate things, many harms that could be
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 The Constitution of the United States 1788 (Amendment I). United States of America. In English.
73 Harawa, D.S. (2014) Social Media Thoughtcrimes. Pace Law Review, 35, pp. 366, 380.
74 See, e.g. Volokh, E. (2016) The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes. UCLA Law Review, 63,
p. 1366; Coenen, D.T. (2017) Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law.  Boston University
Law Review, 97, p. 1533.
75 United States v. Schweitzer. (2017) No. 4: 17CR3094 (D. Neb.), 28 November.
76 See  Strasser,  M.  (2011)  Advocacy,  True  Threats,  and  the First  Amendment.  Hastings
Constitutional Law Quarterly, 38, p. 339.
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caused by threats, might also be caused by advocacy, for instance, certain
political messages are “threatening and should nonetheless be protected”.77
The true threats prohibition “protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence”
and “from the disruption that fear engenders,” and protects people
“from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur”.78
A communication can be considered “threat” if
“it  expresses  an intention  to inflict  harm,  loss,  evil,  injury,  or damage
on another.”79
Nevertheless, numerous  factors  are  taken  into  consideration
in the determination of “true threats,” for instance,
“the reaction  of the recipient  of the threat  and  of other  listeners;  whether
the threat  was conditional;  whether the threat  was communicated directly
to its victim; whether the maker of the threat had made similar statements
to the victim in the past; and whether the victim had reason to believe that
the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence.”80
A defendant’s  background  can  often  be  considered  relevant  towards
the determination of a “true threat”.81
The courts  disagree  on how  “true  threat”  should  be  defined.82
The majority  of courts  use  the “objective  test”,  which  examines  whether
a reasonable  person would  regard the threat  as true.  Nevertheless,  based
on the Supreme  Court’s decision  in Virginia  v. Black,  several  courts  use
the “subjective test”, which examines whether a reasonable speaker would
foresee  that  the recipients  of the communication  would  interpret  it
as threat.83
A “true threat” is a
77 Op. cit., p. 385.
78 See RAV v. St. Paul. (1992) 505 U.S. 377, 388, 22 June.
79 United States v. Jongewaard. (2009) 567 F.3d 336, 340 (8th Cir.), 3 June.
80 United States v. Schweitzer. (2017) No. 4: 17CR3094 (D. Neb.), 28 November.
81 See United States v. Parr. (2008) 545 F.3d 491 (7th Cir.), 18 September.
82 See,  e.g. McCann,  A.E.  (2006)  Are  Courts  Taking  Internet  Threats  Seriously  Enough?
An Analysis of True Threats Transmitted Over the Internet, as Interpreted in United States
v. Carmichael. Pace Law Review, 26, pp. 523, 527.
83 Virginia v. Black. (2003) 538 U.S. 343, 360, 7 April (a “true threat” occurs where the “speaker
directs a threat to a person or group of persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily
harm or death,” without the need for the speaker to intend to carry out the threat).
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“serious  threat  as distinguished  from  mere  political  argument,  idle  talk,
or jest,”
“declaration of intention, purpose, design, goal, or determination to inflict
punishment,  loss,  or pain on another,  or to injure  another  or his  property
by the commission of some unlawful act.”84
Also, a “true threat” is a
“serious  statement  expressing  an intention  to do  an act  which  under
the circumstances  would  cause  apprehension  in a reasonable  person,
as distinguished from idle or careless talk, exaggeration, or something said
in a careless manner.”85
A threatening statement that is merely “hyperbole”, or an exaggeration
that  aims  to add  a “heightened  effect”  to a certain  viewpoint,  without
the intent  to carry  it  out  against  a specific  individual  or property,  is
protected by the First Amendment and cannot be considered “true threat”.86
In Commonwealth  v. Knox87,  for  illustration,  the court  held  that  the “true
threat” doctrine requires the speaker to have “acted with an intent to terrorize
or intimidate.”
In United States v. Tinoco88, the defendant argued that his statements were
not “true threats” as he
“didn’t  intend  to place  the victims  in fear;  (2) his  Facebook  posts  didn’t
reach  the victims;  and  (3) he  frequently  peppered  his  statements  with
the phrase ‘figuratively speaking’.”
However,  the court  rejected  the argument  and  held  that,  as the victim’s
testimony  demonstrates,  the threats  were  taken  seriously  (also,  as per
the defendant’s own admission, according to which the people receiving his
threats “would feel threatened”, and statements: “I mean every word” and “You
can quote me”.)89 Even if
84 United States v. Twitty. (2019) Criminal Case No. 13-CR-00076-RBJ (D. Colo.), 4 January.
85 United States v. Parr. (2008) 545 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir.), 18 September.
86 United States v. Kirsch.  (2015) 151 F. Supp. 3d 311, 313 (W.D.N.Y.),  16 December  (“Strong
language  that,  if taken  literally,  may  seem  to communicate  a threat,  may  not  constitute  a true
threat”).
87 Commonwealth v. Knox. (2018) 190 A.3d 1146 (Pa.), 21 August.
88 United States v. Tinoco. (2018) No. 17-2059 (10th Cir.), 28 March.
89 Ibid.
18 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 14:1
“the alleged threat did not identify any specific person or group,”
the defendant’s  communications  can,  in certain  contexts,  be  interpreted
as true threat.90
In United  States  v. Killen91,  the defendant  posed  as a young  girl
on a messaging-based  mobile-phone  application.  The defendant  sent
to the victims  images  of a partially  dressed  girl  and  asked  and  received
from the boys nude photos of themselves in return.92 When the boys tried
to end the contact  with  the defendant,  the latter  threatened the boys that,
unless  they  will  send  him  more  nude  photos,  he  will  post  the photos
received  on social  media  platforms,  such  as Instagram.93 On appeal,
the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence.94 However, taking
into  account  the electronic  evidence  recovered  from  the defendant’s
electronic devices, and on the admission of the defendant to the extortionate
conduct, the court found that there is
“sufficient evidence  on these  counts  to permit  a jury to find guilt  beyond
a reasonable doubt without testimony from the victims.”95
4.3. SENTENCING ASPECTS
The U.S.S.G., which contains non-binding rules that aim to create a uniform
sentencing  policy  those  convicted  in the U.S.  federal  court  system,  has
numerous  enhancements  that  are  applicable  to these  offenses.  In United
States  v. Sunmola96,  for  example,  the defendant  and  his  co-conspirators
created profiles on dating websites, which included pictures of U.S. military
men  in uniforms  as part  of his  online  profile.  After  gaining  the trust
of women  met  online,  the defendant  and  his  co-conspirators  asked  for
money  and  merchandise.97 The defendant  was  charged  with  several
offenses,  including  interstate  extortion,  in violation  of 18  U.S.C.  § 875(d).
The defendant  also  sexually  exploited  the victims:  he  persuaded  women
to pose in a sexually suggestive positions, in front of a web camera. Without
the victims’ consent, the defendant recorded them, then posted the videos
90 United States v. Cox. (1992) 957 F.2d 264, 266 (6th Cir.), 27 February.
91 United States v. Killen. (2018) No. 15-15001 (11th Cir.), 29 March.
92 Ibid.
93 Ibid.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 United States v. Sunmola. (2018) 887 F.3d 830 (7th Cir.), 16 April.
97 Ibid.
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online  and sent  the relevant  links  to the victims  and their  relatives,  with
an extortion demand, containing the alarming warning that
“by the time he was finished with her she would want to kill herself.”98
The court  in this  case  applied  the following  sentencing  enhancements:
four-level  leadership,99 two-level  for  acting  on behalf  of a government
agency,100 four-level substantial financial hardship,101 a two-level vulnerable
victim,102 a 16-level for an intended loss of $2,054,972.66,103 and a two-level
due  to the perpetration  of the offense  outside  of the United  States.104
The judge also  granted two upward departures,  for  psychological  injury
to a victim and for the gratuitous infliction of injury to a victim.105
The defendant  appealed  the sentencing  enhancements;  however,
the court  held  that  the district  court  did  not  erred  in imposing
the enhancements, as follows, respectively: the defendant had a “high level
of control and authority”  in the scheme; while the defendant argued that he
used the false military status
“to impress his victims, not for the purpose of obtaining a benefit on behalf
of the military or other government organization,”
the court  held  that  he  misrepresented  that  he  was  acting  on behalf
of the military;106 as per  the findings  in the Pre-Sentencing  Report  (PSR),
seven  victims  suffered  substantial  financial  hardship,  some  of them
submitted victim impact  statements;  while  the victims  were  middle-aged
women, rather than elderly, many of the women
98 United States v. Sunmola. (2018) 887 F.3d 830 (7th Cir.), 16 April, at 835.
99 U.S.  Sentencing  Commission.  (2018)  Guidelines  Manual.  Aggravating  Role  § 3B1.1(a).
[online] Available from: https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/§3B1.1. [Accessed 4 June 2019].
100 U.S. Sentencing Commission. (2018)  Guidelines  Manual.  Offense Conduct § 2B1.1(b)(9)(A).
[online]. Available from: https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/§2B1.1. [Accessed 4 June 2019].
101 U.S.  Sentencing Commission.  (2018)  Guidelines  Manual. Offense Conduct § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B).
[online].  Available  from:  https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/§2B1.1.  [Accessed  4  June  2019]
(the substantial  financial  hardship  enhancement  applies  if the offense  resulted
in “substantial financial hardship to five or more victims”).
102 U.S.  Sentencing  Commission.  (2018)  Guidelines  Manual. Hate  Crime  Motivation
or Vulnerable Victim § 3A1.1(b)(1). [online]. Available from: https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/
§3A1.1. [Accessed 4 June 2019].
103 U.S.  Sentencing  Commission.  (2018)  Guidelines  Manual. Offense Conduct  § 2B1.1(b)(1)(I).
[online]. Available from: https://guidelines.ussc.gov/gl/§2B1.1. [Accessed 4 June 2019].
104 Ibid.
105 Op. cit., at 836.
106 Op. cit., at 838.
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“had  been  divorced,  abandoned,  widowed,  or ignored  by the men  in their
lives”
and, through online dating, they were seeking companionship, position that
made them
“particularly  susceptible  to falling  into  the vicious  trap  of a man  who
deceitfully made them believe they were in love,”
therefore vulnerable to extortionate tactics;107 based on
“direct  interviews,  phone  interviews,  mailed-in  statements,  or mailed-in
supporting documentation with the victims describing what happened and
the amount of money they lost,”
the determination  of the total  loss  was  construed  as correctly  calculated
by the court.108
Another  example  of enhancements  application,  United  States
v. Haileselassie, the defendant appealed his sentence, which had two upward
enhancements under the U.S.S.G.  for  “substantial disruption of governmental
function and obstruction of justice”.109 The appeal court, however, citing the
“extensive criminal history, including multiple convictions for threats, false
reports,  harassment,  assault,  trespass,  and  mailing  threatening
communications,”
affirmed the sentence.110 Other  upward U.S.S.G.  enhancements  applicable
to these  offenses  include  substantial  disruption  of governmental  function
and  obstruction  of justice,111 violation  of court  protective  orders,  making
of multiple threats, and intention to carry out the threats.112
107 Op. cit., at 837.
108 Op. cit., at 840.
109 United States v. Haileselassie. (2019) No. 18-1343 (8th Cir.), 10 June.
110 Ibid.
111 Ibid.
112 Irizarry v. United States. (2008) 553 U.S. 708, 128 S. Ct. 2198, 171 L. Ed. 2D 28, 12 June.
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4.4. THE INSANITY DEFENSE
Cyber extortion and threats are specific intent crimes, allowing defendants
to bring  up  defenses  involving  their  mental  or emotional  conditions.113
Importantly, however, insanity is a legal, not a medical aspect.114
Evidence  of a defendant’s  mental  problems  at the time  of the crime  is
brought up to establish the insanity defense. This defense, however,
“is not concerned with the mens rea element of the crime; rather, it operates
to completely excuse the defendant whether or not guilt can be proven.”115
Different from “insanity”, the diminished capacity defense, which regards
a defendant’s ability to come to the required criminal  state of mind,  is not
considered an excuse:
“successful defendants simply are not guilty of the offense charged, although
they are usually guilty of a lesser included offense.”116
As explained  by the court  in United  States  v. Long,  a severe  mental
disease or defect (such as the schizotypal personality disorder) alone, will
not  be  considered  enough  for  the purposes  of 18  U.S.C.  § 17(a),  which
regards the affirmative defense of insanity:
“there must be sufficient evidence  of a temporal and causal nexus between
the symptoms of the disease and the commission of the acts themselves.”117
However,  the defendants  that  have a mental  disease  or defect,  can,  upon
receiving  treatment,  be  rendered  competent  to stand  the trial.  In United
States  v. Arega,  for instance,  the defendant was charged with transmitting
a threatening  communication.118 After  a “regimen  of medications,  including
antipsychotics,” the medical  evaluation  rendered  the defendant  as being
lucid, no longer suffering
113 United States v. Sullivan. (2016) No. 3: 13-cr-00064-HZ (D. Or.), 6 January.
114 See  Kahler  v. Kansas.  (2020)  No.  18-6135  (U.S.),  23  March  ("The insanity  defense  sits
at the juncture  of medical  views  of mental  illness  and  moral  and  legal  theories  of criminal
culpability.");  The Free Dictionary.  Insanity Defense.  [online].  Available  from: https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Insanity+Defence  [Accessed  2  July  2019]  (“A defense
asserted  by an accused  in a criminal  prosecution  to avoid  liability  for  the commission  of a crime
because, at the time of the crime, the person did not appreciate the nature or quality or wrongfulness
of the acts.”). 
115 United States v. Twine. (1988) 853 F.2d 676, 678 (9th Cir.), 1 August.
116 Op. cit., at 678.
117 United States v. Long. (2009) No. 07-31131 (5th Cir.), 5 March.
118 United States v. Arega. (2018) No. 1: 17-cr-00225-TSC (D.C.), 17 January.
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“from  the irrational  and  delusional  ideation  that  he  had  previously
exhibited,”
therefore competent to stand the trial.119
In United  States  v. Christian120,  the defendant,  charged with  two counts
of transmitting,  via  e-mail,  threats  to injure  the person  of another,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), in order to establish that he was incapable
of forming  the specific  intent  to threaten,  raised  the diminished  capacity
defense.  The district  court,  however,  precluded  his  expert  witness  from
testifying.121 The Court of Appeals, held that the district court acted abusively
by not considering the expert’s testimony, which could have helped the jury
decide on the defendant’s capacity
“to form the specific intent to threaten when he sent the emails at issue,” 
and vacated and remanded the conviction for a new trial.122
United  States  v. Ivers  provides  another  example  of mental  competency
examination:  the defendant  was  charged  with  transmission  of threats
to assault  and murder a law enforcement officer,  in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 115(a)(1)(B)  and  18  U.S.C.  § 875(c).123 During  the initial  competency
hearing, the defendant, who claimed that
“federal authorities (he most commonly names the CIA and FBI) implanted
a ‘non  organic  foreign  body/object’  into  his  brain  and  had  been  using
the implant to torture him,”
was  not  found competent  to stand  the trial,  as he  was  assessed  to suffer
“from mental disease or defect,” therefore not mentally competent
“to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him
or to assist properly in his defense.”124
119 Ibid.
120 United States v. Christian. (2014) 749 F.3d 806-8 (9th Cir.), 17 April.
121 Op. cit., at 809.
122 Op. cit., at 811–5.
123 United States v. Ivers. (2018) No. 3: 16-cr-00347-AA (D. Or.), 21 February.
124 Ibid.
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After  several  months  of hospitalization,  the clinical  psychologist  assessed
that the defendant can communicate in a “’very rational’ manner” and can
stand the trial.125
Mental  diseases  or defects  can  also  be  taken  into  consideration  for
reduced  sentences.  In United  States  v. Humphries,  for  illustration,
the defendant experienced
“symptoms  consistent  with  diagnosis  of Post-Traumatic  Stress  Disorder
(PTSD), Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD) and adjustment disorder
with mixed anxiety and depressed mood.”126
Taking  the defendant’s  mental  issues  into  consideration,  the court
granted  a downward  departure  from  the U.S.S.G.  In contrast,  in United
States  v. Wyrick,  the defendant-appellant,  contested  as “substantively
unreasonable”  his  37-month  sentence  for  the numerous  telephone  calls
containing  threats  to injure  the person  of another  he  made,  in violation
of 18 U.S.C.  § 875(c).  The defendant-appellant  cited  his  diagnosed  mental
condition of “Delusional Disorder, Persecutory and Erotomania Type” and
his  “true  first  offender”  status,  and  requested  a downward  sentencing
variance.127 The appeal  court  found  that  a downward  variance,  based
on the defendant’s  mental  illness,  was  unwarranted,  as the defendant’s
behavior
“was no less serious as a result and is no less likely to happen again.”128
The appeal  court  went  on  and,  while  it  acknowledged  the defendant’s
arguments,  considered them  “unconvincing given the  facts  of  the  case”  and
affirmed the sentence of the district court.129
5. CONCLUSION
This article presented a comprehensive analysis of the cyber extortion and
threats  phenomenon.  The article  extends  the understanding
of the phenomenon  by providing  a thorough  understanding
125 Ibid (the defendant  was  administered  the Inventory  of Legal  Knowledge  and
the MacArthur Competence Assessment Tool-Criminal Adjudication).
126 United States v. Humphries. (2013) No. 12 Cr. 347 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y.), 28 October.
127 United  States  v. Wyrick.  (2011)  No.  10-3117  (10th  Cir.),  24  March  (people  suffering  from
Delusional  Disorder-Erotomania  Type  “believe  another  person,  usually  someone  of a higher
social status, is in love with them”).
128 Ibid.
129 Ibid.
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of the attributes  and  of the most  important  litigation  aspects,  such
as the legal elements of these offenses, how the U.S. legal system addresses
them, and sentencing aspects.
The article  evidenced  that  these  communications,  especially  in their
extreme  forms,  can  have  very  serious  consequences,  such  as placing
the victims  in an constant  state  of fear  and  stress,  which  can  result
in a major psychological harm or generalized trauma, disrupting the course
of people's activities, and affecting public interests.
The phenomenon poses complex and many-faceted challenges regarding
the criminalization,  prosecution,  and  sentencing.  For  a more  effective
response  to this  phenomenon,  it  is  necessary  to better  understand
the initiation  and  escalation  of these  offenses,  to form  threat  assessment
professionals,  and  to promote  law  enforcement  best  practice  guidelines.
There  is  also  a need  for  stronger  and  more  coherent  legal  framework,
including uniform interpretation of the legal elements of these offenses and
the explicit  incrimination  of intentional  infliction  of emotional  distress.
Appropriate  protection  of personally  identifying  information,  including
through  encryption  and  redaction,  must  also  receive  adequate
consideration.
The development  of effective  computerized  natural  language  analysis
tools,  employed to analyze the linguistic  features of the phenomenon, can
help  better  control  the phenomenon,  by filtering  out  of such
communications,  triggering  account  termination,  and  referring  such
instances to law enforcement, for a prompt reaction to imminent threats.
General  educational  programs  that  address  related  aspects,  such
as cyberviolence  risks,  personal  data  protection,  preservation  of digital
evidence, appropriate reactions to cyber threats, and incident reporting, can
also play a significant role in the control of the phenomenon.
Even  though  this  article  analyzed  cases  from  just  one  jurisdiction,
the findings  can  be  of interest  to a global  audience.  The findings  of this
article can be used to elaborate educational materials for law enforcement
training programs and for law school clinics,  to develop fact analysis and
client advising skills.
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